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Ted is a forty-three-year-old white male who has had no significant health issues in his
life. He is, and has been, married to forty-five-year-old Sarah for ten years, and while they have
had some issues, Ted has always been there for her. The couple lives together in Chicago,
Illinois. Sarah is a nurse that, unfortunately, has not had the same luck as her husband when it
comes to her overall health. She was diagnosed with diabetes when she was in her late
adolescence. For nearly twenty-five years, Sarah was able to manage the disease with no serious
side effects to her body. Once in her mid-thirties, however, she began developing kidney
problems and was diagnosed with chronic kidney disease (CKD). Slowly, her kidneys stopped
performing the functions they once had.
Recently, Sarah’s CKD developed into end-stage renal disease (ERSD) and she is now in
need of either dialysis or a kidney transplant. Sarah starts on dialysis, but places her name on the
kidney transplant recipient waitlist as well. While the dialysis is her saving grace for some time,
it begins to not work as effectively. Sarah is told by her doctors to explore options within her
immediate family and close friends to see if any of them are a match for a kidney transplant and
willing to participate in the procedure. While Sarah feels uncomfortable asking for such a lifealtering request, she knows it is her best bet.
Ted goes with his wife to the transplant wing of Northwestern University Medical Center
to get preliminary blood work done to find out if he is a match. A few days later, the hospital
calls and tells Ted that his kidney is compatible. Though excited to tell his wife, the doctor
suggests that Ted comes to the hospital to discuss the donation process privately.
Once at the hospital, Ted meets with the transplant surgeon who informs him that while
his blood is compatible with his wife’s, there are many other steps that need to be done before

the transplant can take place. The doctor hands Ted some forms and informative pamphlets
which illustrate the process. He tells Ted to take the materials home, read them over, and get
back to him as soon as he is ready with any questions or to make a decision to carry on with the
process.
Upon reading the information he was given by the doctor, Ted is taken aback by the
number of blood tests, x-rays, and overall lifestyle restrictions that will occur as a result of him
being a donor. His eyes scroll through the numerous pages of the paperwork, where, at some
point, he comes across one section titled “Risk Behaviors”. The section posed fourteen questions
pertaining to his behavioral history, including, but not limited to, drug use, sexual activity, and
exposure to HIV. It explains beneath the list of inquires that participation in any of the named
activities would result in his organ being designated an “increased risk”.1 Ted reads on and learns
that the designation means that his organ requires “special informed consent” from the organ
recipient because it carries a greater likelihood of carrying transmissible, blood borne pathogens,
that may not have been present during the screening process, but could arise prior to
transplantation.2 This period of time is referred to as the “window period” for infection.3 The
document further explains that in order for the transplant to occur at this hospital, Northwestern
Medical must disclose to the recipient the behavior associated with the increased risk status of
the organ. Ted thinks back a year and a half when his marriage was a bit shaky and he had made
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the mistake of cheating on his wife. Ted had used the services of a prostitute on multiple
occasions, though had not done so for the past year. The Northwestern risk behavior form states
that paying for sex at any point in the past three years is a risk behavior which will result in an
increased risk designation of the organ, and thus require special informed consent from the
recipient and disclosure of the risk behavior associated with it.4
Ted now faces a startling dilemma. His wife, Sarah, has been put on the kidney recipient
waitlist, with nearly 80,000 individuals, where she faces the grim reality that an organ match and
transplant could take five years, longer, or may not come at all.5 Sarah is also seeking kidneys
from other sources. Ted can, of course, choose to agree to the disclosure, however, the nature of
their relationship being the prime motivation for donation, divulging this information could
hamper or prevent donation and ruin his marriage.
These two interests, the right of the recipient to be fully informed when making a medical
decision and the privacy rights of the organ donor, are at odds and formulate the question herein
addressed. The scenario illustrated above is what could occur if legal informed consent in living
organ transplantation requires every transplant center to disclose to the recipient the behavior
associated with an increased risk organ. While the relationship between the donor and recipient
is not always a spousal one, it remains that the revelation of private information can still hamper
bonds and expose the donor to stigmatization.6 Additionally consider the coercive effect on the
donor’s decision to donate of a policy which will not allow a donation to occur unless one agrees
to allow the disclosure of private information.7 A donor will feel compelled to reveal private
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See Kuehnert, supra note 1, at 251.
United Network for Organ Sharing, www.unos.org (last visited December 1, 2013).
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See Beauvais, supra note 3, at 2571, 2572.
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See Beauvais, supra note 3, at 2571; But cf., Richard H. Dees, Transparent Vessels?: What Organ Donors Should
be Allowed to Know About Their Recipients, 41 J. LAW, MEDICINE AND ETHICS 323, 327 (2013) (stating that were a
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information because someone’s life is at stake.8 This conflicts with the voluntary aspect of
donation which promotes participation in the process for the purpose of doing a good deed.9

The argument, in part, for disclosure is that the information is material and necessary for
organ recipients to make a “fully informed”, autonomous decision.10 The recipient should, after
all, feel absolutely comfortable with the decision to accept an organ. However the donors have
privacy rights and expectations, and these rights are afforded great protections as to their
personal medical information.11 The legal issue then becomes, Does the organ recipient have a
legal right to the personal information of the living organ donor?
I am not convinced that the need for such information outweighs the importance of
protecting the individual privacy of the organ donor. Therefore, I submit that 1) an organ
recipient’s interest in the information is not paramount to the organ donor’s privacy rights, and 2)
that the organ recipient is fully informed under the law even while withholding the risk behavior
associated with the organ donor.
A number of legal and ethical concerns arise in the context of live-organ donation, each
worthy of being addressed. I will begin my analysis by briefly introducing the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN), its functions, and the goals which dictate
its daily activities. By understanding the many entities and individuals involved in the
transplantation process, one will better grasp the mission of the OPTN, the justification for its
current governing rules, and the legal analysis which follows.

donor permitted to know the recipients private information, the recipient would feel compelled to disclose),
available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jlme.12023/pdf.
8
See Beauvais, supra note 3, at 2571, 2572.
9
See Dees, supra note 6, at 324.
10
See Gordon ET AL., supra note 3, at 2570.
11
Id.

Following this introduction, the second portion of the paper will outline and analyze the
current rules and policies of the OPTN and CMS which govern this legal issue. This will include
policies pertaining to informing and evaluating the potential living donor, protecting the donors’
and recipients’ rights, and the information which is required to obtain the informed consent of a
potential organ recipient. It will be seen that great leeway is given to the respective transplant
programs and surgeons in carrying out their interpretations of the rules.12 Dual regulation of the
transplant community by the OPTN and CMS has led to transplant programs being uncertain in
how to develop in-house procedures that meet the requirements of both and how to address
overlaps in rule-making.13
In part three, I will address the role the common law has played in the development of
informed consent. Pertinent to this section is grasping the concepts and rules of informed consent
that developed through case law. Rules will be taken from the common law and applied to the
context of the living donor issue. The goal of this section is to consider the rules set forth by the
OPTN and CMS and determine whether the information supplied to transplant candidates would
satisfy the informed consent requirements dictated at common law.
Lastly, I will introduce an alternative to requiring risk behavior disclosure. This section
will describe a current program that is being used by the OPTN which could allow donors to aid
in providing an organ to the recipient whom they know, while not having to reveal any risk
behaviors.
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13

See Gordon ET AL., supra note 3, at 2571.
Id.

Part I-THE ORGAN PROCURMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK (OPTN)
As the plausibility of organ transplantation grew in America, so did the interest and
recognition of it’s potential by the general public, the healthcare community, and government
officials.14 A federal initiative was undertaken to create an organization that would establish a
network of organ transplantation entities to be governed under uniform policies, allowing organ
procurement to grow expeditiously throughout the country.15 Of particular concern, was the need
to create a database which would identify organ donors and recipients, as well as arrange for the
acquisition, preservation, and procurement of the harvested organs.16 The National Organ
Transplant Act of 1984 created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN)
and ordered the Secretary of Health and Human Services to promulgate any and all rules
necessary to carry out its mission.17 In 1986, the Secretary contracted a non-profit,
administrative agency, the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), to carry out the OPTN
mission and functions.18 Presently, UNOS remains the entity which manages the OPTN.19
UNOS and the OPTN are responsible for enabling and maintaining an organized and
efficient network capable of, amongst many other duties, developing and implementing policies
to ensure the equitable allocation of available organs, keeping up with scientific and
technological developments in the transplant community, and detecting weaknesses in the organ
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DAVID L. WEIMER, MEDICAL GOVERNANCE: VALUES, EXPERTISE, AND INTERESTS IN ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
44-46 (2010).
15
Id. at 46-47.
16
Id.
17
National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, §372(a), 98 Stat. 2339, 2344 (1984), available at
http://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/PL98-507.pdf.
18
WEIMER, supra note 9, at 47.
19
Id.

network by gathering and analyzing data.20 The entities and individuals that are members of the
organization include transplant hospitals, organ procurement organizations, physicians in the
transplant community, transplant coordinators, histocompatibility labs, as well as individuals
who have participated in the donation process directly or indirectly.21 The organization has since
been responsible for over 500,000 successful living and deceased donor transplantations
nationwide since 1987, saving numerous lives and playing a key role in the scientific
development of the logistically and medically complex procedure.22
Lastly, the enforceable powers granted to the OPTN through legislation are worthy of
addressing. The OPTN does have the authority to discipline its member organizations for failing
to abide by OPTN policies and bylaws.23 This is done though removal of voting rights, dismissal
from board representation, and administering and monitoring a strict compliance program that
the violating member must follow to be placed back in good standing with the organization.24
However, the OPTN cannot suspend or permanently remove the transplant privileges of the
member for violations. 25 This can only be accomplished through recommendations made to the
Secretary of HHS who, ultimately, decides whether or not to take such action based on the
information she receives and the severity of the offense.26 Nonetheless, the ability of the OPTN
to publicly dispense the violative conduct of its members serves as a strong tool to promote
enforcement of OPTN policies.
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National Organ Transplant Act §372; See also, UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, ARTICLES OF
INCORPORATION (June 2009), available at http://www.unos.org/docs/UNOS_ArticlesOfIncorporation_062309.pdf.
21
42 C.F.R. §121.3(b) (2012).
22
UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT (2012), available at
http://www.unos.org/docs/AnnualReport2012.pdf.
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WEIMER, supra note 14, at 53.
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Id.
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Id.
26
42 C.F.R. §121.10(c)(1),(2), (i)-(iv).

The bulk of the enforcement of OPTN policies and discipline comes primarily from the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. CMS requires that all hospitals performing
transplants that participate in Medicare be OPTN members and adhere to the rules and policies
promulgated by the OPTN and approved by the Secretary of HHS.27
Part II- The Policies of the OPTN
Informing the Donor and Recipient: Initial Steps
The process of obtaining fully informed consent from both the donor and recipient begins
at the first appointment and, in many ways, continues throughout the transplant process.28 The
physicians involved are devoted and encouraged to address the importance of maintaining a
healthy donor-recipient relationship.29 OPTN policies obligate transplant hospitals to provide
educational lectures and tutorials to the donor so that he may comprehend the many emotional,
physical, and mental obstacles that could, and likely will, arise.30 In doing so, it allows each
individual to grasp the realities of the surgery and post-surgery life and, perhaps, defunct any
notions of a risk-free, unchallenging experience.31 The functionality of this step in the informed
consent process is to address significant concerns early in the donation so that no surprises which
may affect the donor-recipient relationship arise later on.32
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42 C.F.R. §482.72 (2012).
See Dees, supra note 6, passim.
29
Id.at 328, 330.
30
ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., POLICY 12.0: 12.2 (a)(l):INFORMED CONSENT OF LIVING KIDNEY DONORS, at 12-1 to 12-3, available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf
31
See Dees, supra note 6, at 325.
32
See, e.g., ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,
POLICY12.2-INFORMED CONSENT OF LIVING DONORS: INTRODUCTION, at 12-1 (2013), available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf.; See also Michael M. Abecassis,
John Friedewald, Elisa J. Gordon, Michael G. Ison, Daniel P. Ladner, Elizabeth Reddy, Kidney Transplant
Candidates’ Understanding of Increased Risk Donor Kidneys: A Qualitative Study, 26 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION
359 (2012), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1399-0012.2011.01536.x/full.
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Independent Donor Advocates (IDAs)
While the gift of an organ is considered an altruistic one, it still remains that each party to
the transplantation procedure has interests and rights which must be protected.33 The donor,
through OPTN policy and CMS rules, receives this protection, in part, in the form of an
“Independent Donor Advocate”(IDA).34 OPTN and CMS policy require that all of its transplant
hospitals provide the prospective donor with an IDA.35 The IDA serves to promote the best
interests of the donors, promote their rights, and assist the donors in obtaining and understanding
information as it pertains to each step of the transplantation process.36 This would include
protecting the donors’ privacy as it pertains to the disclosure of risk behaviors learned of in the
evaluation process.37 The IDA serves only the donor, and has no authority in final treatment
decisions or in seeing the transplant through for the benefit of the recipient.38
Consider the scenario in the introduction. Ted, the donor, could certainly voice his
concerns to the IDA that is assigned to him over the policy of disclosing risk behaviors, but little
could be done to address these concerns which would result in non-disclosure and donation, at
least at this hospital. The IDA would likely advise Ted that at no point should he be willing to
disclose this information unless he is entirely ready and is doing so voluntarily and for the
appropriate reasons.39 The IDA would also protect Ted from any improper inducement or
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See Dees, supra note 6, passim.
42 C.F.R. 482.98(d) (2012); ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERV., POLICY 12.4: 12.4.1-IDEPENDENT DONOR ADVOCATES, at 12-8 to 12-9 (2013), available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf.
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Id.
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Id.; See also Dees, supra note 6, at 323, 324.
37
See Dees, supra note 6, at 323, 324.
38
42 C.F.R. 482.98(d)(3)(i)-(iii) (2012); ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, supra note 33.
39
ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., POLICY 12.0:12.3.4
(L)-EXCLUSION CRITERIA, at 12-8 (2013), available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_172.pdf; See also Beauvais, supra note 3, at
2571-572; See also Dee, supra note 6, at 328.
34

persuasive tactics of the transplant hospital in the event that they attempt to coerce him into
agreeing to disclose.40
Transplant Teams-Separate but Equal
Concomitant to the protections offered the donor though the IDA, are those afforded the
recipient by his/her “transplant team”.41 Each party to the transplant has its own team of doctors,
referred to as the “transplant team”, that evaluate and prepare their respective patient for the
procedure.42 The goals of the recipient transplant team are to ensure the likely outcome of the
transplant is a promising one.43 In carrying out this goal, the team is to protect the interests of
the recipient and take all ethical measures needed to guarantee the donor organ is medically
suitable.44 The determination over what information is material to the decision-making process is
left to the medical judgment of the respective transplant program.45 Some organ recipient
advocates argue that this determination should be subjective one, and the materiality of any
information should be left to the organ recipient.46 Researches have also found an overload of
information can actually harm rational decision-making, stating, “more information may not
always benefit the patient, especially in situations where the medical decision is complex, when
there are many options, when the decision is acute and time-sensitive and when there is great
uncertainty.” 47 Another study suggests that providing the information and obtaining specific
informed consent actually results in higher utilization of increased risk organs, though this
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Patient’s Rights 42 C.F.R. 482.13(e) (2012); See also Dees, supra note 6, at 326.
See Dees, supra note 6, at 324, 325.
42
Id.
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Id. at 325.
44
Id.
45
ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, supra note 2; See also, Dees, supra note 3, at 326.
46
See Dees, supra note 6, at 329; Contra, id. at 328 (standing for proposition that allowing a patient to determine
which information is material will place too heavy a burden on the patient).
47
D. W. Hanto, K. Ladin, Informed Consent and Living Kidney Donation: More (Information) Is Not Always
Better, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2547, 2548 (2011) .
41

pertains to transplants in the deceased donor context.48 Clearly, there is a lack of uniformity as to
what is the appropriate amount of information to divulge to a transplant candidate.49 However,
transplant programs remain free to determine their own policies as it pertains to the information
they think should be disclosed to the potential recipient so long as the process remains in line
with the vague regulatory authorities.50
OPTN Policy12.0-Living Donation
The OPTN has policies specific to each and every possible transplant available.51 OPTN
Policy 12.0-Living Donation generally dictates the requirements of its members as it pertains to
living donations.52 The terms of this section expressly provide for the informing requirements
owed to the donor by the hospital, the medical and psychological tests to be performed on the
donor, and social and behavioral evaluations which must be completed prior to transplant
approval.53 Though some of the rules within this section apply to all living donors, most pertain
specifically to living kidney donation.54 The language of the policies in this section are quite
general and do not limit the transplant programs’ ability to apply them, but instead, serve as a
guideline with some articulated requirements.55
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C. Hanrahan, L.M. Kucirka, R.A. Montgomery, R. Namuyinga, D.L. Segev, Formal Policies and Special
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TRANSPLANTATION 629, 634 (2009), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.16006143.2008.02523.x/pdf.
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Id.
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See Kuhnert, supra note 3, at 2570.
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See, ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., BYLAWS (2013), available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Bylaws.pdf#nameddest=Appendix_F.
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ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., POLICY 12.0-LIVING DONATION (2013),
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53
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The expressed informing obligations of the transplant hospital, in the context of a living
kidney transplant, require it to disclose to the organ donor that the hospital will take “all
reasonable measures to protect the confidentiality of the donor and recipient”.56 No definition is
provided to define “reasonable measures”, which seems to leave the transplant hospital to use its
best judgment.57 OPTN policy stipulates the transplant hospitals must inform the donor that all
health information that is obtained during their evaluation “will be subject to the same
regulations as all records and could reveal conditions that the transplant center must report to
local, state, or federal public health authorities.”58 However, it does so without referencing the
specific regulations that “all records” are subjected to, perhaps leaving the donor not as informed
as she could be. The later part of the policy refers to mandatory reporting requirements which
obligate transplant hospitals to disclose patient information, without authorization, for public
health purposes.59
Conspicuously missing from the informed donor policies is any expressed requirement
that the hospital obtain the donors consent in order to reveal health risks to the potential
recipient. The lack of clarity only frustrates the goal of achieving uniformity in hospital policies
and in fully informing donors as to their privacy protections. A survey and study pertaining to
disclosure of risk behaviors revealed many transplant surgeons do decide to reveal the risk
behavior associated with an increased risk donor, at least in the deceased donor context.60 The
study showed that 77% of 422 surgeons surveyed did reveal both the high risk status of the organ
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ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, supra note 51, at 12-1, POLICY 12.2(c).
Id.
58
Id. at 12-3, POLICY 12.2(j).
59
ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., POLICY 7.0-DATA
SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS (2013), available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/PoliciesandBylaws2/policies/pdfs/policy_23.pdf.
60
See Hanrahan, supra note 47, at 631.
57

and the behavior which lead to the designation.61 While privacy is not as much of a concern in
the deceased donor contacts, the study may be read to mean that transplant surgeons do find the
information relevant.
The Public Health Service (PHS) provides transplant programs with the list of risk
behaviors that are used to designate organs as increased risk.62 OPTN policy requires transplant
programs to use the PHS risk assessment guideline when conducting an evaluation of a donor in
regards to questions pertaining to the donor’s past social and behavioral history.63 However, this
evaluation is not limited to the questions set forth in the PHS guideline, allowing a transplant
hospital to add to the list.64 These questions are designed to asses the risk of transmission for
HIV, HBV, and HCV only.65 PHS guidelines limit disclosure to behaviors participated in during
the preceding 12 months.66 However, this is the minimum required time frame. Transplant
programs can adjust this time period as they deem fit. An affirmative answer to any of the
questions results in the increased risk designation of the organ.67 The behaviors indicated by PHS
to be included in the evaluation are the following:
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See id. at 632.
See Kuehnert, supra note 1, at 251.
63
ORGAN PROCUREMENT TRANSPLANT NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., OPTN POLICIES:
REWRITE PROJECT-15.3 IDENTIFICATION OF TRANSMISSIBLE DISEASES, at 192 (2013) (rewrite project was undertaken
in 2013 by the OPTN to better explain the policies to transplant programs…though not an official document, it
serves to aid programs in writing policies), available at
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ContentDocuments/OPTN_Policies_PC_08-2013.pdf#nameddest=Policy15.
64
Id.
65
Kuehnert, supra note 1, at 247.
66
Id. at 251.
67
Id.
62

BEHAVIORS PARTICIPATED IN DURING THE PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS











Sex with anyone known to be infected with HIV, HBV, or HCV
Men who have had sex with other men
Women who have had sex with men that have had sex with other men in the preceding 12 months
People who have had sex in exchange for money or drugs
People who have had sex with a person who had sex in exchange for money or drugs in the
preceding 12 months
People who have injected drugs through intravenous, intramuscular, or subcutaneous route for nonmedical reasons
People who have had sex with someone who has injected drugs though intravenous, intramuscular,
or subcutaneous route for non-medical reasons in the preceding 12 months
People who have been in lock-up, jail, prison, or a juvenile correctional facility for more than 72
consecutive hours
People newly diagnosed with, or have been treated for, syphilis, gonorrhea, Chlamydia, or genital
ulcers
People who have been on hemodialysis

68

In 2011, approximately 7.7% of all transplants came from increased risk donors.69
According to the PHS guideline, from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2011, there were
134 reported transmissions of infectious diseases in recipients that were donor-derived.70 Of
those 134, 104 came between 2008 and 2011.71 And of those 104, ten infections were of HCV,
four were HBV, and one was HIV (the infections which the risk behaviors questionnaire are
designed to address).72 The last living donor infection transmission occurred in 2009, where a
man who had engaged in a risk behavior (sex with another male) transmitted HIV.73 However,
stored specimens revealed that HIV was present in a pre-testing stage, though it may have gone

68

Id.
Abecassis, supra note 37, at 359.
70
Kuehnert, supra note 1, at 259.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 260, 261.
69

overlooked.74 Much of the success in preventing transmission can be attributed to pre-testing
procedures that can limit window periods for infections to as low as five days.75 This supports
studies which indicate that remaining on the wait list is a far more dangerous to health than
accepting a high risk organ.76
The guideline points to two major deficiencies in risk behavior policy, assessment, and
guidance. Firstly, there is little data linking risk behaviors to actual transmissions of infections.77
It states that testing recipients who receive increased risk organs is not required by OPTN policy
and it is not the standard procedure of transplant hospitals.78 The guideline goes on to indicate
that much information is needed before any certainty can be concluded about risk behaviors and
their likely effect on rates of transmission.79 Secondly, and key to this discussion, is that the
guideline points out major deficiencies in reliable research and the “paucity” of data regarding
correlation between the listed risk behaviors and the likelihood the donor has a transmissible
infection.80 A large portion of the guideline is dedicated to discerning what evidence the
originators of the initial risk behavior guideline, released in 1994 and not substantially changed
since, used in determining that there was a correlation between certain behaviors and infections
of HIV, HCV, and HBV in those individuals.81 The authors found that low-quality evidence was
used to create the list, and that, presently, for many of the behaviors, the jury is still out on rates
of infection associated with the conduct.82
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Id. at 260.
76
Id. at 294, 295.
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Id. at 272-295
78
Id. at 296.
79
Id. at 296.
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See Id. at 272-290 (summary of evidence used to evaluate risk factors).
81
Id.
82
Id. at 290.
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The guideline recommends, going forward, that national data be collected on HIV, HCV,
and HBV transmission rates based on donor and recipient testing to better inform policy
decisions and screening requirements.83 It is also suggested that data be collected on behavioral
and non-behavioral risk factors associated with increased incidence and prevalence of HIV,
HCV, and HBV amongst the potential donor population.84 Lastly, the guideline points out the
quantitative deficiency associated with simply labeling an organ “increased risk or non-increased
risk” and proposes that a numerical “risk index” be developed to help patients gauge the actual
threat of infection from a high risk organ associated with a behavior.85 Such endeavors by the
transplant community will go a long way in discerning what information is medically relevant in
disclosure and evaluation policies.
Policy 4.0-Identification of Transmissible Diseases in Organ Recipients
The OPTN addresses the minimum requirements for divulging increased risk organ status
and obtaining informed consent to the organ through Policy 4.2-Requirements for Informed
Consent Regarding risk of Transmissible Diseases.86 The language of the policy indicates that,
“transplant programs must obtain informed consent prior to transplant of an organ when, in the
transplant program’s medical judgment”, the donor:
 Has a known medical condition which may be transmittable to the recipient,
AND/ OR;
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 The donor has been recognized increased risk for disease transmission
(including, but not limited to, those specified in the PHS Guideline…)87

The OPTN provides a list of those transmittable diseases which must be tested for prior to a
living kidney transplantation.88 Where the transplant team has decided, in their medical
judgment, that the tests reveal a risk that they feel requires the informed consent of the recipient,
it will disclose the issue to the patient.89 In regards to risk behaviors, it is made clear in the PHS
Guidelines that no quantitative value is attached to a risk behavior and its likelihood of
transmission, rather, a qualitative indicia of “increased risk, or not increased risk” is all that is
offered.90
Recipients are also informed that it is impossible to comprehensibly screen for all
transmissible diseases or remove all risk of obtaining an infection after transplantation.91 Those
recipients that do receive increased risk organs must have their consent documented.92
Additionally, a strict post-operative care plan is offered to recipients of high risk organs so the
hospital can monitor infections which may occur.93 It seems, through this process, all medically
relevant information is imparted onto the recipient so that a fully informed decision can be made.
It is not required anywhere in this policy that risk behaviors be disclosed.
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Part III- CMS and Organ Transplantation Oversight
The Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services distinguishes its role from the OPTN by
stating it is responsible for the oversight and compliance of the transplant community, whereas
the OPTN serves to promote the equitable and efficient allocation of the organ supply.94 In part,
the objective of CMS oversight is to address minimum standards of acceptable performance
amongst transplant programs.95 CMS seeks to create expectations of performance and high
quality transplant services through comparable performance measurements.96 In 2007, CMS
promulgated conditions of participation (CoPs) for those transplant programs participating in
Medicare and, thus, required transplant centers across the country to abide by the terms of the
CMS regulations in order to obtain approval, or re-approval, of their respective institutions.97 As
part of the conditions of participation, CMS set forth a section devoted to patient and living
donor rights.98 The section provided that each transplant entity ensure the protection and
promotion of the rights of both parties to a transplantation.99
The Rights afforded Recipients through CMS Regulation: Informed Consent
In an effort to protect the rights of the transplant recipient, CMS issued its own rules as to
the minimum criteria necessary to achieve fully informed consent.100 The rules require that
transplant centers institute their own written policies of the informed consent process.101 Most

94

See CENTER FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE SERVICES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., HEALTH
RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, FINAL RULE: 42 C.F.R. 405, 482, 488, at 15198, 15198-15160 (2007)
(CMS explaining the role it will play in the oversight and regulation of the transplant community).
95
42 C.F.R. §482.80(c) (2012); See id.
96
Id.
97
42 C.F.R. §482.
98
42 C.F.R. §482.102
99
Id.; 42 C.F.R. §482.13.
100
42 C.F.R. §482.102(a).
101
Id.

notably, in order for the transplant center’s informed consent policy to comply with CMS
regulations, it obligates the entity to inform the candidate as to: the evaluation process, the
surgical procedure, potential medical and psychosocial risks, organ donor risk factors that could
affect the graft or health of the patient, and his or her right to refuse the treatment.102 CMS
qualifies “donor risk factors” to include, but not limit, informing the patient of, “the donor’s
history, condition or age of the organ used, and the patient’s potential risk of contracting HIV or
other infectious diseases if the disease cannot be detected in an infected donor.” 103 “Donor
history” is a term, however, that remains undefined. It could refer to donor’s relevant medical
history, any significant family medical history, or the donor’s social behavioral history. This
leaves the term open for interpretation by the transplant program.
The CMS regulations do not expressly distinguish between recipients of living donor
high risk organs from those that receive high risk organs from deceased donors.104 Therefore, it
could be presumed that the patients’ rights in the informed consent process and the information
that are entitled to receive are the same in both types of transplants.105 Additionally, there is no
rule limiting the transplant hospital’s ability to disclose other risk factors, outside of those stated
in the CMS regulation, that the medical team finds are significant to the patient in making their
decision.106 The CMS regulations dictate that the determination of what donor risk factors that
should be disclosed to a recipient ought be left to the transplant surgeon, but that, at a minimum,
all factors addressed in §482.102(a) should be discussed.107
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CMS and Donors: Privacy Protections
The CMS protections afforded donor privacy in the living donor context are stated rather
briefly in the regulations. Initial protection of patient privacy is provided in the conditions of
participation which mandate that the patient maintain his right to personal privacy throughout the
care process and that the clinical records of the patient be kept confidential. 108 CMS adds
further protections for patients through its living donor consent requirements which obligate the
transplant centers to inform the donor that all communications between the donor and the
transplant center are “to remain confidential, and in accordance with the requirements proscribed
under 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164”.109 The CFR provisions referenced in this rule are better
known as The HIPAA Privacy Rule.110
CMS and Protections Afforded under The HIPAA Privacy Rule
The terms of The HIPAA Privacy Rule dictate which disclosures of protected health
information (PHI) require authorization and consent directly from the patient and which uses do
not necessitate such written or oral permission.111 While organ procurement organizations fall
outside of the control of these disclosure limitations, transplant hospitals are subjected to the
provisions of the law.112 The sections of the HIPPA Privacy Rule discussed here illustrate the
legal requirements covered entities have in protecting PHI, instances where covered entities are
permitted to use PHI for particular purposes, and circumstances where authorization for
disclosure is not required at all.
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The Privacy Rule requires all covered entities to advise patients of the legal duties the
entity has in regards to keeping all PHI confidential.113 Where a particular treatment is being
offered, the hospital must give adequate notice to the patient of the uses and disclosures of
protected health information that may be made by the hospital in the course of that treatment.114
The hospital must also advise the patient of his legal rights in regards to such information, which
include: unrestrained access to his protected health information, the right to protest a disclosure,
and access to a record that accounts for all disclosures of patient PHI.115 The notice must be
written out in plain language for the patient and include examples of the types of disclosures
which may occur.116 Patients retain the right to object to disclosures prior to treatment through
entering into legally binding agreements with the hospital restricting the use of the
information.117 However, the hospital does not have to agree to enter the restriction agreement
simply because the patient disagrees with the disclosure.118
A hospital is permitted to use the PHI of a patient for the purposes of carrying out:
treatment, payment, and healthcare operations.119 Hospitals do not have to obtain consent from
the patient in using PHI where it concerns performing these functions of his care.120 However,
the covered entity is limited to disclosing PHI to only those parties that are necessary to carry out
the treatment of that patient.121 For instance, where the treatment of a third-party patient is
concerned, another patient’s PHI is not permitted to be disclosed under this provision to aid in
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the care of that third-party patient.122 It seems then that, in the context of a living donor
transplant, where a hospital intends to use the PHI of the donor in obtaining the informed consent
of the recipient, it must notify the donor of this intent, and must receive authorization and
consent from the him to do so.
Possible Loopholes for Unauthorized Disclosures for Transplant Hospitals in HIPAA
The Privacy Rule recognizes that health institutions must reveal certain medical
information to particular entities and persons without having to receive the permission of the
patient.123 This allowance is granted when, for instance, a medical or health entity is required to
report information for the purposes of research, reporting is necessary for the benefit of the
public health, or to notify institutions of a significant health threat.124 In the context of living
transplantation, unauthorized disclosures will occur to satisfy OPTN reporting requirements,
when the HHS or CMS makes a request for information, or when an infection occurs and those
affected need to be notified.125
Transplantation is specifically referenced within the Privacy Rule in regards to deceased
organ donation.126 It permits the use and disclosure of PHI by a covered entity to other
transplant programs in the context of cadaveric organ, tissue, or eye donation and
transplantation.127 There is no rule within the permitted unauthorized disclosures section that
allows revealing the PHI of a living organ donor to an organ recipient without consent from the
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donor. A transplant hospital could, perhaps, attempt to interpret the “threat to health” exception
to allow an unauthorized disclosure of donor PHI because it permits unauthorized disclosures in
order to avert a serious threat to health or safety.128 In order to do so, however, a covered entity
must make a good faith determination that disclosure is necessary to “prevent or lessen a serious
and imminent threat to a person”.129 It would be a far stretch for a transplant hospital to argue
that the revelation of the risk behavior of an organ donor to the recipient falls under the
exception. The legislation, likely, would have provided for an exception in the permitted
unauthorized disclosures section to address the need to reveal the PHI of a living donor if it felt
the circumstances required it.
Part IV-Informed Consent and the Common Law
Informed consent, at common law, provides a patient with a legal remedy where he has
been harmed because he was left unaware by the physician of information which would have
played a significant role in his medical decision-making process.130 The common law
development of informed consent has played a pivotal role in preventing patients from being left
with inadequate information when making a medical decision.131 Particularly, the courts have
found that the informed consent theory has come to illustrate and uphold the fiduciary
relationship between the physician and the patient, and the duties owed by the physician in that
relationship.132 Physicians are thus required to disclose to patients, prior to treatment, the risks
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associated with a particular type of treatment, the likelihood of such risks occurring, alternatives
to the treatment, and any other medically relevant information that could affect the decisionmaking of the patient.133
A physician has a duty to disclose to a patient information that will enable him to
consider and weigh knowledgeably the options for medical treatment available and the risk
attendant to each.134 In some states, the approach is not what the reasonable patient would want
to know, but rather, what the prudent physician would disclose as so the procedure.135 This
deviates from other views, such as New Jersey, which consider informed consent to be a patient
centered concept. An action for breach of informed consent, in most states, is based upon failure
to disclose a material risk of a proposed treatment that would compel a reasonable person in that
patient’s position to reject the treatment.136 Where a patient/plaintiff is bringing an action for a
physician’s failure to obtain informed consent, the plaintiff must prove:
1. Doctor failed to give plaintiff all material information that a reasonable person
in the plaintiff’s position would expect a doctor to disclose so that plaintiff could
make informed decision about course of treatment
2. The undisclosed risk occurred
3. A reasonable person under the circumstances of this case would not have
consented to the treatment or operation had they been so informed AND
4. The course of treatment or operation was a proximate cause in producing
plaintiff’s injuries or conditions 137

133

Id. at 548 (citing Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 459, 457 A.2d 431 (1983)).
Caputa v. Antiles, 296 N.J. Super. 123, 133 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (“predicated on the duty of a
physician to disclose to a patient such information as will enable the patient to make an evaluation of the nature of
the treatment and of any attendant substantial risks, as well as of available options in the form of alternative
therapies (quoting Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 208 (1988))).
135
Willis v. Bender, 593 F.3d 1244, 1255-256 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Wyoming uses the reasonable professional
standard”).
136
Saks v. Ng, 383 N.J. Super. 76, 92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (the test for materiality is based upon
whether a patient in the plaintiff’s position would consider the risk material (citing Matthies v.
Mastromonaco, 160 N.J. 26, 36 (1999))).
137
Id. at 94.
134

The elements listed above apply to those states that take the patient-centered approach to
informed consent.138 The determination of what information is to be disclosed to a patient is
considered “not subjective as to either the physician or the patient, but rather, it
remains objective with due regard for the patient's informational needs and with suitable leeway
for the physician's situation.”139 For instance, a patient highly susceptible to contracting a
particular disease due to a personal immunodeficiency must be informed of that risk, whereas
another patient may not face the same threat and thus, does not require the information because
the threat is not material. Therefore, a risk cannot be presumed material and is instead a question
left to the finders of fact.140
It is not what that plaintiff would have decided if properly advised, but what a reasonably
prudent person in the plaintiff’s position would have decided if fully informed.141 A subjective
characteristic of a patient, such as a bias against homosexuals, cannot be considered when
determining whether information is material to the medical decision-making process.142 It
beckons the court to ask whether or not knowing such information would have changed the
decision of the reasonable patient and would the outcome had been different for the patient if the
information had been disclosed.143
In Adamski v. Moss, 271 NJ Super. 513 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1994), the Court
concluded that knowledge of a risk in the medical community could be established through the
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defendant’s expert or by use of medical literature.144 This is a practical and substantial
consideration when placed in the context of the informed donor recipient. It beckons the
transplant community to determine whether knowledge of risk behaviors and their possible
effects on transmission rates has been substantially accepted in the medical community and
whether this knowledge impacts recipient outcomes.
Informed consent lawsuits have been brought against hospitals that were unable to detect
an infection prior to the transplant.145 The claim in Baylor University Medical Center v. Biggs,
237 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. App. 2007), was brought following an infection from a cadaveric organ.146
The plaintiff was the recipient of an organ infected with rabies that died about a month after the
transplant.147 The plaintiff’s estate argued that the transplant hospital, and it’s surgeons, failed to
inform the decedent as to the high risk nature of the organ donor and, if they had, the decedent
would have declined the organ.148 The court evaluated the informed consent claim under the
rules of the state which required the plaintiff to show the “undisclosed risk would have
influenced a reasonable person in making a decision to consent to the procedure.”149 It found
that while that informed consent claim could certainly be brought and upheld in these
circumstances, the plaintiff’s expert reports failed to establish the proper standard of care, the
breach, and the causation which connecting the breach to the injury.150 Specifically, the court
pointed to shortcomings in establishing the proper procedure for informed consent in
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transplantation, whose duty it was to disclose the information, and whether it was possible to
discern the status of the deceased donor at the time of the transplant.151
I am persuaded that the most appropriate application of informed consent in the medical
context requires one to ask, “Would a reasonable patient find the information material in making
a medical decision?” Materiality must be an objective measure in this case, and there is simply
no support that any degree of certainty has been concluded in regards to the actual effects
disclosing the risk behaviors of a donor has on infection transmission rates or successful
transplantation.152 While certain patients may, in fact, change their minds upon learning of the
risk behavior associated with the status of the organ, I do not believe the objectively reasonable,
prudent patient would. The recipient is made aware of a risk, that being the possibility of
transmission, for which the cause of has no effect on the impact or severity of that risk. The
ethical considerations concerning the privacy of the donor and the legal protections afforded him,
must, as a result, be paramount to the need to disclose.
Part V-Paired Exchange and Other Alternative to Risk Behavior Disclosure
All transplant candidates are permitted to enter and utilize the “Paired Exchange”
program.153 The Paired Exchange program is used when a transplant candidate has a willing
donor, but that living donor is not a compatible kidney match with the recipient. Consider the
following: Donor-Recipient Pair1 have incompatible kidneys. Donor-Recipient Pair 2 is also
incompatible. However, the Donor in Pair 1 is compatible with the Recipient in Pair 2. Likewise,
the Donor in Pair 2 is compatible with the Recipient in Pair 1. The Paired Exchange program
151
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will orchestrate a transplantation where the Donor in Pair 1donates his organ to the Recipient in
Pair 2, and the Donor in Pair 2 donates his organ to the Recipient in Pair 1.154
This exchange could be completed while maintaining the confidentiality of any
personally identifiable information of either of the donors as to the recipients. Where a donor is
not willing to consent to having his risk behaviors disclosed to the known recipient, he should be
offered the opportunity to place his organ on the Paired Exchange list where his personally
identifiable information can be left confidential. Though the donor in our scenario is actually
compatible, his reasons for being more comfortable with the paired exchange need not be
revealed to the recipient.
Conclusion
This paper has presented and analyzed the transplantation process, the protections and
rights afforded donors and recipients in it, and the legal sources for those rights and protections.
It discussed the vagueness associated with many of the requirements placed upon transplant
programs in following the rules and policies administered, and the broad interpretation
allowances the overseeing agencies permit the programs to use when developing in-house
protocol related to informed consent and privacy procedures.
The policy requirements thrust upon transplant programs though the Organ Procurement
and Transplant Network and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, I find, fully provide
for the legal informed consent of the organ recipient. Furthermore, the expressed legal
protections afforded donors under CMS regulations and through HIPAA do not permit such
unauthorized revelations of protected medical information. There exists too little information,
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both quantitative and qualitative, to scientifically correlate risk behaviors to infections and their
actual effect on transmission rates. While the CMS regulations call for the transplant programs to
initiate discussions about donor history with the recipient, such a discussion can be limited to the
risks posed by the donor’s history without revealing personal privacy matters. It is essential that
the ethical concerns of the donor be appropriately recognized and protected in this case.

